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A Creditor’s Kerfuffle: How the SBRA Harms
Creditors in Small Business Cases
I. INTRODUCTION
The Small Business Reorganization Act (“SBRA”) took effect on
February 19, 2020.1 Under the SBRA, subchapter V was created,
generating a new avenue for small business debtors to attempt to
reorganize their debts and continue their businesses.2 The SBRA does
not eliminate the law governing debtors who elect to undergo a traditional
Chapter 11 bankruptcy process.3 Instead, subchapter V provides an
option to help small business debtors “streamline the bankruptcy process
by which [they] reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.”4
Traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures were often ineffective for
small business debtors since the section was designed for larger, more
sophisticated corporate debtors. 5 Subchapter V empowers small business
debtors by removing procedural barriers and lowering some financial
hurdles to a reorganization in bankruptcy.6
In subchapter V, the SBRA provides qualifying small business
debtors with an alternative to traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy. 7

1. Paul W. Bonapfel, A Guide to the Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 93 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 571, 574 (Winter 2019) (“[The SBRA] took effect on February 19, 2020, 180
days after its enactment.”).
2. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (2020).
3. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 576. (“SBRA does not repeal existing provisions that
govern small business debtors in chapter 11. Those provisions continue to apply to small
business debtors who do not elect to proceed under subchapter V.”). In this Note, the process
established by the SBRA will be called “subchapter V”; the other avenue a debtor may choose,
which existed prior to the SBRA and continues to exist, will be referred to as a “traditional
Chapter 11 bankruptcy.”
4. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-171, at 1 (2019) (“H.R. 3311, the ‘Small Business Reorganization
Act of 2019,’ would streamline the bankruptcy process by which small business debtors
reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.”).
5. See Michael Blackmon, Revising the Debt Limit for “Small Business Debtors”: The
Legislative Half-Measure of the Small Business Reorganization Act, 14 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN.
& COM. L. 339, 344 (2020) (“Traditional Chapter 11 does not ‘work for small and mediumsized businesses because the [code] places unrealistic and artificial deadlines on small and
medium-sized businesses’ which prevents them from restructuring.”).
6.See id. (“Subchapter V provides debtors with ‘a powerful suite of tools to negotiate a
deal with its creditors and, if negotiations break down, subchapter V provides a simplified
method of confirming a Chapter 11 plan over a creditor's objection.’”).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 1187(a) (spelling out the debtor’s duties if he or she elects to use
subchapter V).
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However, the SBRA does not eliminate traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy
procedures as a potential avenue for a qualifying small business debtor.8
Traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures are still available to a
debtor if he or she chooses to forego or is ineligible for the newly minted
subchapter V.9 Only “small business debtors” as defined by the SBRA
may access subchapter V.10 The SBRA defines a small business debtor
as a person engaged in commercial or business activities with an
aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debt of $7.5
million at the date of the petition’s filing.11
The SBRA removed mechanisms deemed by many to be costprohibitive administrative expenses and disclosure efforts. 12 Traditional
Chapter 11 reorganizations provide for the appointment of a committee
of unsecured creditors at the debtor’s expense, but this provision is not
carried over to subchapter V cases.13 Unlike traditional Chapter 11
reorganizations, subchapter V does not require the written disclosure
statement to be provided by the debtor.14 Instead, Subchapter V cases
make the “Absolute Priority Rule” inapplicable,15 and instead use the
“Best Efforts Rule.”16 Traditional Chapter 11 reorganization cases take
much longer than a subchapter V reorganization should take.17 Further,

8. See Blackmon, supra note 5, at 576 (“SBRA does not repeal existing provisions that
govern small business debtors in chapter 11. Those provisions continue to apply to small
business debtors who do not elect to proceed under subchapter V.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1181
(establishing certain provisions of traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy inapplicable in
subchapter V bankruptcy proceedings).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (stating which specific provisions of the traditional Chapter 11
bankruptcy process do not apply in subchapter V or apply only conditionally in the subchapter
V process yet leaving the traditional Chapter 11 process available to debtors).
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining which debtors qualify as a small business under the
SBRA and therefore who may access subchapter V).
11. See id.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making both 11 U.S.C. § 1102 and 11 U.S.C. §1125 inapplicable);
11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“[T]he United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity security
holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (requiring a
written disclosure statement to be provided to the Court in connection with its filed plan).
13.11 U.S.C. § 1181 (setting forth provisions of Chapter 11 bankruptcy which are not
applicable in subchapter V).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule, which requires debtors to
put all of his or her projected disposable income to be received in the three to five years toward
making payments under the plan following the first payment due under the confirmed plan).
17. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (requiring the debtor to file a plan within 90 days of the
order for relief in a subchapter V case) with 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (requiring a plan to be filed
within 300 days of the filing date in a traditional Chapter 11 case).
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the SBRA grants small business debtors enormous flexibility once their
plan is filed on subchapter V’s expedited basis.18
While SBRA is an admirable attempt to give salvageable small
businesses a lifeline, it goes too far in protecting debtors.19 It allows
debtors to hide information regarding their finances since it requires little
disclosure.20 Further, it grants debtors too much leniency by neither
setting a time limit for plan confirmation nor limiting the modifications a
debtor may make to the plan once it is filed.21 Though the maze of filing
deadlines, barrage of fees and administrative expenses, and destruction
of equity rights in the business have long deterred small business owners
from choosing to enter Chapter 11, the reforms of the SBRA subchapter
V of Chapter 11 bankruptcy have swung the pendulum too far in the other
direction, much to the detriment of creditors.22
While small business interests in reorganization are crucial in the
United States economy, the free and easy flow of credit is equally
important. This Note examines the substantial debtor-friendly changes
made to the Chapter 11 bankruptcy in subchapter V of Chapter 11 for
small business debtors, analyzes the actions debtors are likely to take in
the reorganization process, and ultimately concludes that the SBRA goes
too far in empowering small business debtors to the detriment of
creditors’ rights.23
The Note proceeds in six parts. Part I introduces the SBRA and
discusses how it weakens creditors’ recoveries. 24 Part II discusses the
informational asymmetry caused by removing statutory tools creditors
need to gather information about the debtor’s financial state of affairs,
and addresses the inadequacy of counterbalancing measures in the SBRA
to ensure adequate information is provided to the small business debtor’s
18. 11 U.S.C. § 1193(a) (allowing debtors to modify their plan at any time before
confirmation so long as the plan meets the requirements of § 1122 and § 1123).
19. See Blackmon, supra note 5, at 345 (“Thus, the SBRA ‘holds the promise of improving
the likelihood of reorganization for a viable small business debtor by reducing the time,
expense of a proceeding, and eliminating certain legal impediments to confirmation of a
Chapter 11 plan.’”).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable the statutory requirements of filing a
disclosure statement and the formation of unsecured creditors’ committees); see also
Christopher G. Bradley, The New Small Business Bankruptcy Game: Strategies for Creditors
Under the Small Business Reorganization Act, 28 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 251, 274 (2020)
(“The problem of disposable income manipulation is exacerbated by the lowered disclosure
requirements of subchapter V.”).
21. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (“The lack of a deadline for confirmation or of
limitations on plan modification may present serious concerns for creditors.”).
22. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1182 (defining who qualifies as a
small business debtor for the purposes of the SBRA).
23. Bradley, supra note 20.
24. See infra Part I
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creditors.25 Part III discusses problems with the new Best Efforts Rule
and the ways in which these problems are exacerbated by the statutorily
manufactured problem of asymmetrical information. 26 Part IV discusses
potential solutions to the problem posed by the informational
asymmetries in the context of determining what a debtor’s “Best Efforts”
ought to be under a confirmed plan.27 Part V discusses the undue leverage
granted to debtors by the lack of a required time frame for plan
confirmation and the capacity of bankruptcy judges to prevent plan
modification as a means of twisting the arms of creditors.28 Finally, Part
VI draws conclusions.29
II. KNOWLEDGE IS POWER: HOW THE SBRA WEAKENS CREDITORS’
CAPACITY TO RECEIVE PROPER PAYMENT
Subchapter V creates a mountain of asymmetrical information
problems for creditors seeking to recover from a debtor in bankruptcy; it
does so by removing crucial investigative mechanisms that were deemed
cost-prohibitive administrative expenses and procedural tasks.30 Though
the lack of disclosure statements in subchapter V cases is a boon to
debtors seeking to reorganize quickly and cheaply,31 its absence will soon
prove to be a bane to creditors seeking to enforce their rights.32
Both the Chapter 11 creditors’ committee and the required
disclosure statement served important functions in providing information
to creditors during the debtor’s reorganization in a traditional small

25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See infra Part V.
29. See infra Part VI.
30. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making both 11 U.S.C. § 1102

and 11 U.S.C. §1125 inapplicable); 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“[T]he United States trustee shall
appoint a committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional
committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the United States trustee deems
appropriate.”); 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (requiring a written disclosure statement to be provided to
the Court in connection with its filed plan).
31. See Ethan D. Dunn, Faster, Cost-Effective, and Streamlined Reorganization Under
Subchapter V, MICH. B.J. (June 2020) at 35–36 (discussing the ways in which the SBRA
removes hurdles, such as mandatory disclosure statements and the appointment of unsecured
creditors’ committees, to a small business’ successful reorganization under subchapter V of
Chapter 11).
32. See generally, Bradley, supra note 20 (discussing the ways the SBRA will damage
creditors).
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business Chapter 11 reorganization.33 Information regarding the debtor’s
financial state of affairs is at a premium when calculating what the
payments ought to be under a confirmed plan, for a debtor’s ability to
hide financial information can effectively allow him or her to lowball
creditors in the confirmed plan.34
Under a traditional small business Chapter 11 reorganization,
debtors would be required to file disclosure statements providing
creditors “adequate information.”35 Adequate information is a high
standard; it requires debtors to provide information about a debtor’s
books, records, federal tax consequences, and other information that
would enable a hypothetical investor to make an informed judgment
about the plan.36 The debtor must make “full and fair disclosure” during
the entire reorganization process beginning from the date the Chapter 11
petition is filed.37 Courts have found a disclosure statement inadequate
for various reasons, including: failure to enumerate assets and liabilities,
failure to provide reasons for the debtor’s financial difficulty, failure to
provide creditors with the cash requirement needed by debtors to operate
their properties, failing to identify any escrowed funds held on behalf of
debtor’s tenants, failing to reveal the status of any pending litigation

33. Bob Lawless, The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019 and COVID-19, CREDIT
SLIPS (Mar. 15, 2020) https://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2020/03/the-small-businessreorganization-act-of-2019-and-covid-19.html. [https://perma.cc/2HXP-NZ6F] (discussing
the power of the procedural aspects the SBRA makes inapplicable and the capacity debtors
will have to abuse the subchapter V process without some oversight).
34. Bradley, supra note 20, at 274. (“The problem of disposable income manipulation is
exacerbated by the lowered disclosure requirements of subchapter V.”).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (requiring debtors to file disclosure statements providing
creditors with “adequate information” about the business).
36. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (defining “adequate information” to require the provision
of information of a kind, and in sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable in light of
the nature and history of the debtor and the condition of the debtor's books and records,
including a discussion of the potential material Federal tax consequences of the plan to the
debtor, any successor to the debtor, and a hypothetical investor typical of the holders of claims
or interests in the case, that would enable such a hypothetical investor of the relevant class to
make an informed judgment about the plan.).
37. In re Momentum Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d 1132, 1136 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Of prime importance
in the reorganization process is the principle of disclosure. The Code obliges a Debtor to
engage in full and fair disclosure, providing to creditors ‘information of a kind, and in
sufficient detail, as far as is reasonably practicable . . . that would enable a hypothetical
reasonable investor typical of holders of claims or interests of the relevant class to make an
informed judgment about the plan . . . This disclosure requirement does not attach only to the
preparation of disclosure statements. ‘Full and fair’ disclosure is required during
the entire reorganization process; it begins ‘on day one, with the filing of the Chapter 11
petition.’”) (emphasis added).
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against debtors and their assets, and failing to identify tax consequences
which might arise as result of the debtor’s reorganization.38
Subchapter V removes the disclosure statement requirement
unless the bankruptcy court orders it.39 Subchapter V’s most intensive
disclosure requirement mandates only that a filed plan include a brief
history of the debtor’s business operations, a liquidation analysis, and
projections about the debtor’s ability to make payments under the
proposed plan of reorganization.40 The SBRA, however, does not
provide for judicial review to determine what the minimum disclosure
requirements may be.41 Put simply, the adequate information standard is
a much more exacting standard than subchapter V’s disclosure
requirements, and such information is crucial to creditors in the
bargaining process. 42
The SBRA’s abolition of creditors’ committees furthers the
assault on a creditor’s capacity to collect information about the debtor’s
financial affairs. 43 Traditional Chapter 11 allows unsecured creditors to

38. Hall v. Vance, 887 F.2d 1041, 1043 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The bankruptcy court found that
the Statement failed: (1) to enumerate the assets and liabilities, accounts receivable, physical
condition and maintenance required for each parcel of real property; (2) to provide the reason
for debtors' financial difficulty; (3) to provide the creditors with the cash requirements needed
by the debtors to operate the properties; (4) to identify any escrowed funds held on behalf of
the debtors' tenants; (5) to reveal the status of any pending litigation against the debtors and
their assets; and (6) to identify the tax consequences which may arise as a result of the debtors'
reorganization. These failures are clearly contrary to § 1125(a)(1); therefore, we must reject
the Halls' contention that the bankruptcy court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous.”).
39. See Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable 11
U.S.C. § 1125’s disclosure statement requirement unless the court orders the production of a
disclosure statement).
40. See 11 U.S.C. § 1190 (setting forth the required contents of a subchapter V plan).
41. Id.; see also Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 599 (“Subchapter V does not require that the
plan contain ‘adequate information,’ and it does not provide for judicial review of the required
information.”).
42. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (defining “adequate information); see also In re
Momentum Mfg. Corp., 25 F.3d at 1136 (interpreting “adequate information” to require full
and fair disclosure of information of a kind that would enable hypothetical reasonable
investors to make an informed judgment about the proposed plan); Hall, 887 F.2d at 1043
(holding that 11 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)’s “adequate information” standard required an extensive
list of documentation regarding the debtor’s financial affairs) with 11 U.S.C. § 1190
(requiring plans filed under subchapter V to include a brief history of the debtor’s business
operations, a liquidation analysis, and projections regarding the debtor’s ability to make
payments under the proposed reorganization plan).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable § 1102); 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“Unless the court
for cause orders otherwise, a committee of creditors may not be appointed in a small business
case or a case under subchapter V of this chapter.”).
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appoint a committee of creditors.44 These committees of unsecured
creditors had an investigative role in traditional small business
bankruptcy cases.45 They examined the debtor’s acts, conduct, assets,
liabilities, financial condition, business operations, and the desirability of
continuance of the debtor’s business.46 Abolishing the unsecured
creditors’ committee—which serves an information-gathering role—is
yet another way that the SBRA saddles the capacity of creditors to obtain
information about the financial affairs of the small business debtor. 47
The SBRA attempts to bridge this gap by appointing a trustee to
help “facilitate the development of a consensual plan of
reorganization.”48 The trustee’s duties are otherwise ill-defined,49 and it
seems likely that the statute’s vaguely contemplated actions of the
subchapter V trustee will be inadequate for the purposes of gathering
information for creditors for several reasons. 50 To begin, the SBRA
imposes no duty upon the trustee to investigate the debtor’s affairs absent
a court order.51 Trustees are likely to see their roles as helping to confirm
a feasible plan because the SBRA is explicit in authorizing a trustee to
44. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (“Except as provided in paragraph (3), as soon as practicable after
the order for relief under chapter 11 of this title, the United States trustee shall appoint a
committee of creditors holding unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of
creditors or of equity security holders as the United States trustee deems appropriate.”)
45. 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (“A committee appointed under section 1102 of this title may . . .
investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the
operation of the debtor’s business, and the desirability of the continuance of such business,
and any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.).
46. Id.
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 (making inapplicable 11 U.S.C. § 1125 which allowed classes of
unsecured creditors to create a committee of unsecured creditors in the subchapter V process).
48. Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(7) (“The trustee shall . . .
facilitate the development of a consensual plan of reorganization.”); see also Ralph Brubaker,
The Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 39 BANKR. L. LETTER, NO. 10 at 1–4 (Oct.
2019) (“Instead of committees, [Subchapter V, like Chapters 12 and 13] relies on [a] standing
trustee to protect the rights of unsecured creditors.”).
49. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (requiring the trustee to appear at conferences and be heard on
several matters but not imposing a general duty to investigate); see also Bonapfel, supra note
1, at 583 (“Although the responsibility of the Subsidiary V trustee to participate in the plan
process and to be heard on plan and other matters implies a right to obtain information about
the debtor’s property, business, and financial condition, a sub V trustee, like a chapter 12
trustee, does not have the duty to investigate the financial affairs of the debtor.”).
50. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583 (discussing the necessary qualifications and roles
suggested by practitioners the trustee might play in subchapter V cases); see also Lawless,
supra note 33 (noting the role the trustee might take in differing circumstances).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183(b)(2) (requiring the trustee to play an investigative role as
defined in § 1106(a)(3) only if the court so orders); 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(3) (“A trustee shall .
. . investigate the acts, conduct, assets, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, the
operation of the debtor's business and the desirability of the continuance of such business, and
any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan.”).
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help a debtor develop a plan of reorganization and suggesting a goal of
confirming a consensual plan.52 Not only does the trustee owe the
creditors no duty, but the trustee’s financial interests could be at odds
with unsecured creditors; his or her fees will be paid out of the disposable
income plan payments before any unsecured creditors are paid.53 An
active trustee would bill more hours, thereby reducing the amount of
money that may otherwise go to unsecured creditors. 54 Thus, a trustee is
a poor substitute for the investigative powers of a secured creditors’
committee, as the trustee is unlikely to provide much information
regarding the state of the debtor’s financial affairs.55 As will be discussed
in Parts III and V respectively, this lack of information creates
asymmetrical information when calculating plan payments under the Best
Efforts Rule and attempting to object to improper plan modifications.
III. DEBTORS’ “BEST EFFORTS” TO DIMINISH CREDITORS’ RECOVERIES
The SBRA’s abolition of the Absolute Priority Rule is among its
most substantial changes to small business Chapter 11 reorganization.56
Subchapter V cases make the Absolute Priority Rule inapplicable 57 and
instead uses the Best Efforts Rule.58 Under traditional small business
Chapter 11 reorganizations, the Absolute Priority Rule prohibits
52. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (requiring the appointment of a trustee in subchapter V cases and
outlining the trustee’s duties); see also Donald L. Swanson, SBRA: Frequently Asked
Questions and Some Answers, 39 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 2 (Nov. 2019) (“This provision is
unique: in no other place does the Bankruptcy Code (1) authorize a trustee to help a debtor in
possession develop a plan of reorganization, or (2) suggest the goal of a ‘consensual plan’
when the absolute-priority rule does not apply.”).
53. Bradley, supra note 20, at 269 (“Second, the trustee’s financial interests may directly
conflict with those of the unsecured creditors in particular. The fees of the trustee—which, as
mentioned under the new Act may be paid over time as part of the plan—may drain any
‘disposable income’ plan payments that would otherwise go to unsecured creditors.”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)’s Absolute Priority
Rule).
57. Id. (making inapplicable § 1129(a)); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (establishing the Absolute
Priority Rule, which dictates that junior creditors may not be paid before members of a
dissenting class with claims senior to theirs nor can equity interest holders keep their equity
under a plan if all senior claims are not first paid in full).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule, which requires debtors
to put all of his or her projected disposable income to be received in the three to five years
toward making payments under the plan following the first payment due under the confirmed
plan). To be clear: the “Best Efforts Rule” is not the same as the “Best Interest Test.” The
Best Interest Test, as set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), requires all creditors to be paid at
least as much in the Chapter 11 proceeding as they would otherwise get in a Chapter 7
proceeding in order to confirm the plan, and it remains in full effect in both traditional and
subchapter V bankruptcy proceedings.
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absolutely both the paying of any junior creditor and prohibits any equity
interest holder from retaining its interest if there were any senior claims
that had yet to be fully paid.59
If a small business debtor elects to proceed under subchapter V
instead of traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedures, the Absolute
Priority Rule will not apply.60 Instead, subchapter V cases are governed
by the Best Efforts Rule.61 The Best Efforts Rule requires all of the
projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in a three to five
year period after the first payment under the plan is due to be used to
make payments to unsecured creditors under the plan.62 The repayment
period cannot exceed five years. 63
Courts apply the Absolute Priority Rule in traditional Chapter 11
reorganizations to bar the debtor from retaining property without
payment in full to unsecured creditors.64 Application of the Absolute
Priority Rule ends many otherwise confirmable Chapter 11 plans, and is
even more likely to end a traditional small business reorganization under
Chapter 11 because reorganization may be impossible for a small
business if the current owners cannot retain their interests. 65 Smaller
businesses are often owned and operated by a single individual with a
personal stake in the business’s success.66 The Absolute Priority Rule
deters small business debtors—particularly those that are solely owned
and operated—from filing for Chapter 11 reorganization at all for fear
that the debtor would lose its equity interest entirely if it was unable to
pay all of the unsecured creditors’ claims.67
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (establishing the Absolute Priority Rule, which dictates that
junior creditors may not be paid before members of a dissenting class with claims senior to
theirs nor can equity interest holders keep their equity under a plan if all senior claims are not
first paid in full).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable § 1129(a) with respect to the unsecured
creditors).
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule, which requires
debtors to put all of his or her projected disposable income to be received in the three to five
years toward making payments under the plan following the first payment due under the
confirmed plan).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 607 (“In an individual case, many courts conclude that the
absolute priority rule prohibits the debtor from retaining property without payment in full to
unsecured creditors.”).
65. See Dunn, supra note 31, at 36 (discussing the unique harm posed to small business
cases in traditional Chapter 11 cases by the Absolute Priority Rule).
66. Blackmon, supra note 5, at 349 (“A common feature of smaller businesses is a ‘unified
ownership and management’ structure that emphasizes an owner’s personal stake in seeing
the business thrive.”).
67. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (barring equity holders from retaining their interests in the business
unless all unsecured creditors’ claims are paid off first).
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Subchapter V’s Best Efforts Rule is substantially more debtorfriendly.68 The new Best Efforts Rule requires all of the projected
disposable income of the debtor to be received in the three to five-year
period after the first payment under the plan goes towards making
payments on the plan.69 Key considerations in the confirmation of a plan
under the Best Efforts Rule include: how projected disposable income is
determined, how the court decides whether the required period should be
longer than three years, and if it is to be longer than three years, how the
court determines how much longer the period should be. 70 The debtor
need only estimate disposable income for a period of three to five years
and pay that amount to creditors in order to retain their equity interest.71
There is no requirement that anything be paid to unsecured creditors at
all.72
Whatever problems it has, abolition of the Absolute Priority Rule
would frustrate the purposes of subchapter V.73 In essence, subchapter V
allows existing business owners to maintain their control and ownership
of the business even if they confirm a plan that does not pay a dime to
general unsecured creditors.74 Despite the controversy over the failure to
pay unsecured creditors, abolishing the Absolute Priority Rule was
necessary to provide meaningful change for small business debtors
because small businesses are commonly owned and operated by one
person.75 The Absolute Priority Rule—if allowed to impact small
business debtors under the SBRA—would operate to divorce the most
interested party in the small business’ subchapter V reorganization from
68. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the “Best Efforts Rule”). The “Best Efforts Rule”
is not so named by the statute; scholars and judges have named 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) requiring
debtors to allocate their disposable income to plan payments the “Best Efforts Rule.”
69. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (“As of the effective date of the plan the plan provides that all
of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received in the 3-year period, or such
longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix, beginning on the date that the first
payment is due under the plan will be applied to make payments under the plan.”).
70. Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 609 (“Key confirmation issues are: (1) How is projected
disposable income determined? (2) How does the court determine whether the required period
should be longer than three years?; and (3) If so, how does the court determine how much
longer the period must be?”).
71. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191 (discussing the necessary payments of disposable income to
unsecured creditors without requiring that any money actually go to said unsecured creditors).
72. Id.
73. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 607 (discussing the consequences of replacing the
Absolute Priority Rule with the Best Efforts Rule).
74. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c)(2) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule in place of the Absolute
Priority Rule for the purposes of subchapter V plan confirmation).
75. Blackmon, supra note 5, at 349 (“A common feature of smaller businesses is a ‘unified
ownership and management’ structure that emphasizes an owners’ personal stake in seeing
the business thrive.”).
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his interest in the business.76 This is necessary for the continuation of the
business if reorganization is to occur, in the service of unsecured creditors
who are likely to receive a smaller payout anyway. 77 Though the
abolition of the Absolute Priority Rule is necessary for the SBRA to
function, the Best Efforts Rule goes too far, much to the detriment of
creditors.78
That the Best Efforts Rule is more desirable than the Absolute
Priority Rule in the context of bankruptcy reorganizations of small
business debtors says little about its own merits.79 The Best Efforts Rule
requires a plan to provide that all of the projected disposable income of
the debtor be applied to make payments under the plan.80 The statutory
definition of disposable income requires the debtor to subtract certain
expenses from his projected revenue during the three to five year period
during which they are making plan payments.81 Expenses which are
“reasonably necessary to be expended . . . for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, or operation of the business
debtor” fall outside of the statute’s definition of “disposable income.”82
Though this rule contemplates the payment of items like payroll, utilities,
rent, insurance, taxes, acquisition of inventory or raw materials, and other
expenses ordinarily occurred when running a business, problems arise
when the debtor wishes to establish a reserve or invest income to increase
the business’ profitability.83

76. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (forbidding a debtor from retaining an interest in the business
unless unsecured creditors are paid in full).
77. Id.
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (establishing the Best Efforts Rule in place of the Absolute
Priority Rule for the purposes of subchapter V plan confirmation).
79. See id. (defining a plan to be “fair and equitable with respect to each class of claims or
interests” if it “provides that all of the projected disposable income of the debtor to be received
in the 3-year period, or such longer period not to exceed 5 years as the court may fix,
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan will be applied to make
payments under the plan.”).
80. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (setting forth the disposable income requirement of the Best
Efforts Rule).
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d)(1)(B) (defining “disposable income” not to include expenses
necessary for the continuation, preservation, or operation of the debtor’s business).
82. See id. (excluding particular expenses necessary for the continuation and operation of
the debtor’s business from the definition of “disposable income”).
83. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d)(2) (allowing deductions from “disposable income” where the
expenditure is reasonably necessary to the operation of the business); see also Bonapfel, supra
note 1, at 611 (discussing what expenditures are and are not to be considered “reasonably
necessary to be expended” for “maintenance or support” under § 1191).
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The permissible expenditures of disposable income are written
vaguely and encourage malfeasance by subchapter V debtors.84 The
statutory language as written will incentivize small business debtors to
calculate projected revenues at the lowest possible level while
maximizing projected expenses, thereby producing an artificially low
disposable income to be paid to unsecured creditors. 85 This sort of debtor
malfeasance is not only encouraged but rewarded: if the projected
disposable income is lower than the actual profit, then the statute provides
no obligation that the debtor share the additional profits with his creditors
or even inform them of his miscalculation.86 The language of the statute’s
exclusions from the Best Efforts Rule is itself vague and easily
manipulated too.87 Many expenditures can be argued to be “necessary
for the . . . preservation” of the business, and courts are very likely to
defer to the trustee—who has statutorily granted discretion to investigate
the debtor’s property, business, and financial condition and monitor the
debtor’s payments—if the trustee allows a given expenditure.88
Debtors know more about their own finances and prospects than
do their creditors.89 Debtors have every incentive to minimize estimated
revenues and to maximize their projected expenses to decrease their
projected disposable income90 and there is no requirement that any
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (requiring disposable income to be paid to unsecured creditors
for a period of three to five years after the payment period has begun); see also § 1191(d)
(setting forth expenses which may be excluded).
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d) (excluding “expenditures necessary for the continuation,
preservation, or operation of the business of the debtor” and “for the maintenance or support
of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor” from the definition of disposable income which
must be paid to unsecured creditors). However, 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(2) still requires that
secured creditors either retain their liens or be paid in full in order to confirm the plan.
86. See id. (setting forth the requirements for disposable income); see also Bradley, supra
note 20, at 273 (discussing the incentives for and ways in which debtors may misrepresent
their disposable income as per the § 1191(d)).
87. See 11 U.S.C § 1191(d). (excluding expenditures necessary for the continuation,
preservation, or operation of the business of the debtor); see also Bonapfel, supra note 1, at
611 (“[§ 1191(d)(2) contemplates the payment of items such as payroll, utilities, rent,
insurance, taxes, acquisition of inventory or raw materials, and other expenses ordinarily
incurred in the course of running the business.”).
88. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583–84 (listing the statutory powers and duties of the
trustee in a subchapter V case); see also Brendan G. Best, Challenging the Sub-V Election,
39 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 47 (Dec. 2020) (discussing courts’ deference to trustees regarding
the trustee’s decisions to exercise their discretion in not appointing unsecured creditors’
committees).
89. Bradley, supra note 20, at 274–75 (“Debtors have superior information about their own
finances and their future prospects, and they will be capable of producing the three to five
year income projections that best suit their preferences.”).
90. Id at 274 (“The problem of disposable income manipulation is exacerbated by the
lowered disclosure requirements of subchapter V.”).
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additional profit beyond the projected disposable income be shared with
creditors or even disclosed.91 The lack of a disclosure statement creates
an asymmetrical information problem. This issue combines with the
debtor’s incentive to minimize estimated revenues and maximize
estimated expenses in order to lowball creditors. These actions go
undetected because the debtor will never have to disclose the disparity
between the reported disposable estimates and actual disposable
income.92
IV. MITIGATION: TRYING TO CONSTRAIN THE BEST EFFORTS RULE
The potentially flexible definition of “necessary expenditure”
under the Best Efforts Rule is problematic by itself, but its harm is
compounded by the inability of the creditors to acquire information
regarding the debtor’s financial state.93 The removal of unsecured
creditors’ committees, the lack of disclosure statements,94 the
ineffectiveness of the appointed trustee due to the trustee’s ill-defined
statutory role in subchapter V cases,95 the incentive for debtors to mislead
creditors on their projected revenues and expenses, 96 and the unclear
parameters of what constitutes an “expenditure necessary for the
continuation, preservation, or operation of the business debtor” make the
Best Efforts Rule rife with opportunities for abuse by crafty debtors. 97
If courts provide leniency with regard to what expenditures are
necessary for the continuation of the business, a legislative solution may
be necessary. 98 The first proposed legislative solution would be to better
define what constitutes an expenditure necessary to the preservation or
the continuation of the business under the Best Efforts Rule.99 While a

91. Id. at 259 (“And remarkably, if the debtor’s disposable income proves to be higher than
estimated, there is no requirement that the additional profit be shared with creditors.”).
92. Id. at 274 (“The problem of disposable income manipulation is exacerbated by the
lowered disclosure requirements of subchapter V.”).
93. See id. at 269 (discussing how the trustee can be used to minimize the worst effects of
the Best Efforts Rule on creditors).
94. See Small Business Reorganization Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (2020) (removing the
required disclosure statement and the requirements for creditors’ committees).
95. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (defining the role of the subchapter V trustee).
96. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 273 (discussing the incentives for fudging the numbers
regarding projected revenues and projected expenses).
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c).
98. Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (arguing that courts are likely to be lenient to newly
reorganized subchapter V debtors in the wake of their emergence from subchapter V
reorganization).
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d) (allowing the deduction of expenditures necessary to the
continuation of the business from the disposable income payments).
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perfect definition is perhaps not possible due to the statute’s purpose,100
some boundaries are necessary to help courts balance debtor
reorganization and the proper payment of debts to creditors under the
Best Effort Rule in order to prevent debtors from exempting frivolities
from their disposable income.101
The other potentially useful amendment to the SBRA would be
to better define the subchapter V trustee’s role in the case.102 Specifically,
this could be amended to impose a duty of investigation and disclosure
rather than what appears to be a minimal, mediatory role.103 This would
form a better compromise between the debtor and creditors than simple
mediation because it could make up for some of the information
deficiency created by the removal of unsecured creditors’ committees and
the inapplicability of the required disclosure statement in subchapter V
cases. 104 The major downside to this amendment is that it may harm
unsecured creditors in some instances by engaging the subchapter V
trustee more, thus driving up expenses to be paid out of the disposable
income otherwise available to creditors. 105 Still, subchapter V cases
differ on their facts, and, if there is sufficient capacity for the debtor to
produce disposable income, then the expended fees may end up
increasing recoveries despite increased trustee fees.106 This would make
it more difficult for the debtor to game its projected revenue and expense
numbers in an attempt to decrease disposable income that must be paid
to unsecured creditors. 107
100. See H.R. REP. NO. 116-171, at 1 (2019) (“H.R. 3311, the ‘Small Business
Reorganization Act of 2019,’ would streamline the bankruptcy process by which small
business debtors reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.”).
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191(d) (setting forth the Best Efforts Rule and the disposable income
requirements therein).
102. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (setting forth the duties and powers of the subchapter V trustee).
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1183 (setting forth the duties of the subchapter V trustee); see also
Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583 (“Although the responsibility of the sub V trustee to participate
in the plan process and to be heard on plan and other matters implies a right to obtain
information about the debtor’s property, business, and financial condition, a sub V trustee,
like a chapter 12 trustee, does not have the duty to investigate the financial affairs of the
debtor.”).
104. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making the provisions allowing the appointment of a committee of
unsecured creditors and the requirement that debtors file a disclosure statement inapplicable
in subchapter V cases); see also Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583 (“Although the responsibility
of the sub V trustee to participate in the plan process and to be heard on plan and other matters
implies a right to obtain information about the debtor’s property, business, and financial
condition, a sub V trustee, like a chapter 12 trustee, does not have the duty to investigate the
financial affairs of the debtor.”).
105. Bradley, supra note 20, at 269 (discussing the ways in which trustee’s fees may drain
any “disposable income” which would otherwise go to unpaid unsecured creditors).
106. Id.
107. Id.
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V. THE LACK OF REQUIRED TIME FRAMES TO CONFIRM PROPOSED PLANS
In addition to the disadvantage in bargaining imposed upon
creditors by asymmetrical information caused by the removal of
procedural obligations, creditors are further harmed in the bargaining
process by the SBRA’s required timeline.108 If a debtor elects to
reorganize under traditional Chapter 11 processes, he or she must file a
plan within 300 days of the filing date.109 Only the small business debtor
may file a plan in the first 180 days after the date for the order for relief
in a traditional Chapter 11 bankruptcy.110 The debtor must then confirm
a plan within forty-five days of filing the plan.111 This is not so in
subchapter V cases.112
Subchapter V reorganizations are much swifter than traditional
Chapter 11 reorganizations of small businesses.113 The debtor must file
a plan within ninety days of the order for relief. 114 The SBRA requires
the small business debtor to hold a status conference within sixty days of
the order for relief to “further the expeditious and economical resolution
of a case” under subchapter V.115 The small business debtor must file and
serve a report on all parties detailing the efforts the debtor has and will
make to attain a consensual plan of reorganization at least fourteen days
before that conference. 116 No creditor will ever have an opportunity to
file a competing plan in a subchapter V case. 117 The debtor may modify
any plan it files at any time so long as the plan has not been confirmed;
there is no limitation on the number of modifications the debtor can make

108. See 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (granting subchapter V debtors the exclusive right and obligation
to file a plan within 90 days after the order for relief); 11 U.S.C. § 1191 (discussing the
requirements for plan confirmation).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 1121(e) (requiring a plan to be filed within 300 days of the filing date in
a traditional Chapter 11 case).
110. See id. (“In a small business case . . . only the debtor may file a plan until after 180
days after the date of the order for relief . . . “).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) (setting a 45-day deadline for confirmation once the
reorganization plan is filed).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (requiring the debtor to file a plan within 90 days of the order for
relief in a subchapter V case).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1188(a) (mandating a status conference for small business debtors within
60 days of the entry for the order of relief).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 1188(c) (mandating a report no later than 14 days before the mandatory
status conference).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (granting debtors the exclusive right to file a plan in subchapter V
cases).
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to the plan before it is confirmed.118 There is no deadline by which a filed
plan must be confirmed.119
The SBRA granted debtors great leverage over creditors whose
recoveries are reduced by delays in subchapter V reorganization
proceedings.120 As the time spent in the reorganization process drags on,
the bankruptcy estate will spend more money and the case will lose value,
thereby damaging creditor recoveries. 121 The small business debtor can
prolong this process using subchapter V’s procedural tools, for the debtor
can act to damage creditor recoveries by extending the time spent in the
subchapter V bankruptcy reorganization process by utilizing its capacity
to unilaterally amend the filed plan before it is confirmed. 122 Each time
the debtor does so the case will be extended, assets will diminish, and
there will be no end to this gamesmanship in sight because there is no
time frame in which a filed plan must be confirmed under the subchapter
V process.123
While creditors will be impacted differently by this sort of
gamesmanship depending on their security or priority, the extent of the
assets present in a given case may still incentivize even well-situated
creditors to be leveraged into agreeing to confirmation plans in an
endeavor to protect or salvage their own recoveries, which only diminish
as the process drags on.124 Meanwhile, debtors are incentivized to claim
that they are working without rest to form a reasonable and confirmable

118. 11 U.S.C. § 1193 (allowing debtor to modify a plan at any time before confirmation).
119. Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (arguing the lack of a deadline for confirmation or of

limitations on plan modification may present serious concerns for creditors); 11 U.S.C. § 1189
(discussing filing a plan); § 1191 (setting confirmation requirements); 11 U.S.C. § 1193
(allowing debtor to modify an unconfirmed plan at any time).
120. Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (discussing he ways in which debtors can extend their
cases to gain leverage over creditors).
121. Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter 11: A
Challenge to Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 625 (2009) (“The professional fees and other
expenses associated with a Chapter 11 case diminish the value available to creditors . . . In
addition, the time spent in bankruptcy itself leads to the loss in value, comprising an indirect
cost.”).
122. 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (granting debtors the exclusive right to file a plan in subchapter V
cases); § 1193 (allowing debtor to modify a plan at any time before confirmation).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable § 1129(e)); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(e) (requiring
small business debtors to confirm a filed plan within 45 days).
124. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 107, at 625 (“The professional fees and other
expenses associated with a Chapter 11 case diminish the value available to creditors . . . In
addition, the time spent in bankruptcy itself leads to the loss in value, comprising an indirect
cost.”).
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plan, and they need only a bit more information about their financial
futures to finish it.125
The problem of asymmetrical information arises once again in
this context. Despite the importance of not allowing disingenuous
statements to go unchallenged where the creditor has good reasons to
doubt the debtor’s good faith, the creditor is less likely to have the
information necessary to articulate such a reason due to the diminished
disclosure requirements of the debtor, the lack of an investigating entity,
and the subchapter V trustee’s role as a mediator rather than an
investigator.126
There are several possible solutions to the leverage posed by the
lack of a confirmation deadline in the SBRA.127 The clearest option
would be to amend the statute to set a deadline by which a plan must be
confirmed after filing a confirmation plan in accordance with statutory
procedures to prevent indefinite diminution of a case’s value.128
However, such an amendment may be slow in coming, and the
responsibility may rest with judges to protect the value of cases and
thereby creditor recoveries by taking more skeptical positions towards
the debtor throughout the process to ensure that modifications to
unconfirmed filed plans are made in good faith rather than to twist
creditors’ arms. 129
VI. CONCLUSION
The SBRA seeks to reduce the time spent in the reorganization
process for subchapter V debtors by removing expensive and the timeconsuming barriers to the benefits of successful Chapter 11

125. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (arguing that debtors will use § 1193 to modify
and extend the time it takes to confirm their cases to gain bargaining leverage over creditors
by diminishing creditors’ recoveries).
126. Id. at 269 (“While subchapter V trustees are not statutorily charged with investigating
the debtor’s affairs, most trustees will likely feel uncomfortable ignoring credible complaints,
and will undertake to develop at least some view regarding the credibility of debtors’ financial
information and projections. A “squeaky wheel” strategy may work for a creditor that can
articulate concrete and well-founded objections to the debtor’s proposed course of action.”).
127. See 11 U.S.C. § 1189 (setting forth filing requirements for subchapter V debtors); 11
U.S.C. § 1191 (setting forth the requirements of a confirmable plan); § 1193 (setting forth
requirements for modification of a proposed yet unconfirmed plan).
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1191 (lacking a deadline for plan confirmation).
129. See Bradley, supra note 20, at 272 (“The lack of a deadline for confirmation or of
limitations on plan modification may present serious concerns for creditors. Debtors may well
develop the practice of filing placeholder plans early in the case and then modifying them
over time—perhaps over great lengths of time. In the absence of statutory guidance
concerning the permissibility of such behavior, creditors may appeal to the court for relief.”).
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reorganizations for small businesses.130 The SBRA removes required
disclosure statements and barred the appointment of unsecured creditors’
committees to reduce the costs and complexity of Chapter 11
reorganization for small business debtors.131
However, the
inapplicability of these provisions may harm creditors’ capacity to
effectively gather information about the state of the debtor’s financial
affairs.132 An informational asymmetry was created that gives debtors
increased leverage in negotiating plan confirmations. The best way to
alleviate this informational asymmetry is to impose a duty of
investigation on the subchapter V trustee.133
In the absence of a reformed SBRA granting creditors a greater
ability to discover information about debtors’ financial state of affairs,
debtors will be incentivized to hide the ball in calculating their disposable
income under the Best Efforts Rule.134 Debtors will undervalue projected
income, overvalue expenses, and attempt to argue for deductions from
the Best Effort Rule’s disposable income requirement for expenditures
reasonably necessary for the continuation of the business. Due to the
decreased capacity of creditors to gain information about the debtor’s
financial affairs, this will be even more difficult to combat. The best
remedy available is for the legislature to set a stricter standard for what
sort of expenditures are necessary for the continuation of the business.
Finally, the lack of a deadline for plan confirmation in subchapter
V reorganizations grants debtors too much negotiation leverage over
creditors because the debtor will be empowered to hold up the case
through modifications to the plan so long as it remains unconfirmed. If
130. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 574 (“The purpose of SBRA is ‘to streamline the
process by which small business debtors reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs.’ A
sponsor of the legislation stated that it allows small business debtors ‘to file bankruptcy in a
timely, cost-effective manner, and hopefully allows them to remain in business,’ which ‘not
only benefits the owners, but employees, suppliers, customers, and others who rely on that
business.’”).
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1181 (making inapplicable the provisions of the bankruptcy code
requiring debtors seeking to undergo Chapter 11 bankruptcy to file disclosure statements or
fund appointed unsecured creditors’ committees).
132. See Bradley, supra note 20 (arguing that some of the SBRA’s reforms damaged
creditors’ ability to investigate debtors’ financial situations).
133. See Bonapfel, supra note 1, at 583–84 (discussing how a court may impose
investigative duties upon the subchapter V trustee if the judge finds it necessary); see also
Bradley, supra note 20, at 269 (“While subchapter V trustees are not statutorily charged with
investigating the debtor’s affairs, most trustees will likely feel uncomfortable ignoring
credible complaints, and will undertake to develop at least some view regarding the credibility
of debtors’ financial information and projections.”).
134. 11 U.S.C. § 1191(c) (setting forth the Best Efforts Rule requiring debtor to dedicate
projected disposable income to be received to making payments under the confirmed
reorganization plan).
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the debtor manages to successfully delay the confirmation of a plan and
prolong the reorganization process then the case’s value will decline, and
creditor recovery will too. An amendment to the SBRA limiting the
debtor’s capacity to amend filed plans would cede an appropriate amount
of the leverage back to creditors, but judges can effectuate this same
policy by taking a more skeptical view of debtors’ claims when
modifications are requested.
JONAH R. HALL
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